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Red River, White Law
By Laura Spitz
Tribal Law Journal Blog
June 19, 2019
In the last two years, the Ganga and Yamuna Rivers were granted legal personality
by the High Court of Uttarakhand, India;[1] the Te Awa Tupuawas declared a ‘legal
entity’ as part of a settlement between the New Zealand Crown and the
Whanganui iwi people;[2] and environmentalists brought an action on behalf of the
Colorado River to have it declared “capable of possessing rights similar to a ‘person’”
in the United States.[3] This year, voters in Toledo, Ohio, adopted the Lake Erie Bill of
Rights[4] and activists in the Pacific Northwest continue in their quest to establish
the Salish Sea as a person.[5] In each case, claimants seek to establish water as a
rights-bearing subject. This strategy has tremendous appeal, not least because it
rests on the premise that rivers, lakes, and oceans are living and essential to the
health of our ecosystem and mutual well-being. This, in turn, is resonant of
Indigenous teachings and practices that emphasize the connectedness among all
beings, human and nonhuman, spiritual and physical, natural and supernatural.
But the U.S. attempts are troubling for their failure to meaningfully engage
Indigenous laws and lifeways here in the United States.[6] In the Colorado River case,
for example, plaintiff’s amended complaint referred to the fact that “[t]hirty-four (34)
Native American reservations exist within the Colorado River Basin,”[7] but did not
discuss or draw on the laws or culture of any of the tribes that claim traditional
authority over the river or adjacent lands. Instead, plaintiff invoked the Te Awa Pupua
example from Aotearoa New Zealand and emphasized the evolution of legal
personhood in the context of U.S. corporations. Contrast this with the Te Awa Pupua
example, which rested on the acceptance and use of Māori legal and cultural
practices in developing what Justice Joseph Williams has described as the ‘third
law,’[8] a legal solution “which [drew] upon both Māori and colonial legal systems to
create something previously unknown to both.”[9]
Not only did the Colorado River plaintiff fail to recognize a significant role for tribes
directly affected by environmental degradation in the area, it failed to acknowledge
the ways in which developments elsewhere in the world were responsive to historical
disputes specific to those regions. Again, take the Te Awa Tupua example. The
Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act was passed “to give effect to a deed to
settle the historical claims of the Whanganui iwi as they relate to the river.”[10] The
Whanganui iwi had claimed that New Zealand had breached its obligations to
the Māori under the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi,[11] and that they had lawful authority
over the river, which flowed through traditional Whanganui iwi territory.
Interestingly, some suggest settlement terms declaring the river a legal entity were
driven, at least in part, by the fact that neither New Zealand nor the Māori could

accept the river ‘belonging’ to the other.[12] Thus, the grant of legal personality
paved the way for co-management and permitted each side to ‘win’ without losing.
Ultimately, the Colorado River case was dismissed with prejudice on plaintiff’s
unopposed motion because—in plaintiff’s words—“[w]hen engaged in an effort of
first impression, [plaintiff] has a heightened ethical duty to continuously ensure that
conditions are appropriate for our judicial institutions to best consider the merits of a
new canon.”[13] It is not clear what plaintiff meant by “ethical duty,” nor why plaintiff
came to believe the conditions for moving forward were inappropriate, but this
seems the right decision. No matter how well-intended, advocates reaching for
personhood on behalf of rivers in the United States must think carefully about how to
meaningfully engage the Indigenous peoples directly affected, or risk continuing
practices of colonization. In that sense, the Colorado River case was a missed
opportunity to contextualize the claim in terms of local Indigenous laws and cultures.
Its dismissal provides an opportunity to reset and reach out before moving forward
again.
Laura Spitz, J.D., University of British Columbia Allard School of Law; J.S.D., Cornell
Law School; Associate Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law. Heartfelt
thanks to John Borrows for encouragement and the title; Katherine Sanders and
Yvonne Zylan for reading and commenting on earlier drafts; and Jena Ritchey for
terrific editing and research assistance.

[1] Salim v. Uttarakhand, (Mar. 20, 2017) PIL. No. 126 of 2014 HC of Uttarakhand at
Nainital (India). The order has been stayed. Alexandre Lillo, Is Water Simply a Flow?
Exploring an Alternative Mindset for Recognizing Water as a Legal Person, 19 Vt. J.
Envtl. L. 164, 167, 177 (2018).
[2] Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (N.Z.).
[3] The action was dismissed by consent. Order, Colorado River Ecosystem v. State
(filed Dec. 4, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW).
[4] Toledoans for Safe Water, The Lake Erie Bill of Rights Citizens
Initiative, http://www.lakeerieaction.org (last visited May 29, 2019).
[5] Legal Rights for the Salish Sea, http://legalrightsforthesalishsea.org (last visited
May 29, 2019).
[6] It is true that the group advocating rights for the Salish Sea recently expanded its
bases to invoke Native “ways,” after the fact and without any specificity. They do
acknowledge, however, that the rights of the sea may be in conflict with the rights of
others, including Indigenous peoples. FAQs Salish Sea, Legal Rights for the Salish
Sea, http://legalrightsforthesalishsea.org/legal-rights-for-the-salish-sea-faqs/.
[7] Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief para. 19, Colorado River
Ecosystem v. State (filed Nov. 3, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW). For its part, the

State of Colorado only refers to Indigenous Peoples once, in its motion to dismiss the
amended complaint, for the purpose of arguing that injuries (if any) cannot be traced
to Colorado given the multitude of involved actors—including Native Americans—and
interstate and international compacts, court decisions and statutes. Defendant State
of Colorado’s Motion to Dismiss at 9-10, Colorado River Ecosystem v. State (filed Oct.
17, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW).
[8] See Katherine Sanders, ‘Beyond Human Ownership’? Property, Power and Legal
Personality for Nature in Aotearoa New Zealand, 30 J. Envtl. L. 207, 223 (2018) (citing
to Justice Joseph Williams, The Harkness Henry Lecture Lex Aotearoa: An Heroic
Attempt to Map the Maori Dimension in Modern New Zealand Law, 21 Waikato L. Rev.
1, 32-34 (2013)).
[9] Id.
[10] Professor Sanders, for example, argues that the “[u]se of the legal personality
model was prompted by a stalemate: neither the [New Zealand] Crown nor iwi were
prepared to relinquish their claim to authority over the … river.” Id. 230.
[11] Id. 208.
[12] Id. 230. See also Andrew Geddis & Jacinta Ruru, Places as Persons: Creating a
New Framework for Māori-Crown Relations, in The Frontiers of Public Law (Jason NE
Varuhas & Shona Wilson Stark eds., 2019).
[13] Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint with Prejudice para. 8,
Colorado River Ecosystem v. State (filed Dec. 3, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-02316-NYW).

